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ABSTRACT 
 
Learning in extremely hazardous operations requires organizations to rely on other forms of 
organizational knowledge mechanisms than experimentation and trial-and-error. Studies of 
high-risk organizations reveal that despite the trying conditions they are operating within, 
some of these organizations display outstanding safety records (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991). 
Research that integrates studies of high-risk organizations with mainstream organizational 
literature is relevant because it provides a window into organizational effectiveness under 
trying conditions (Scott, 1994; Weick et al, 1999). In adherence with this, the paper reports 
results from a contingency study on organizational knowledge within the emergency 
organization of a petroleum production company operating in the North Sea. 
 
Results show that there are multiple organizational knowledge activities within an emergency 
organization. This broad action repertoire includes different levels of information richness, 
collective practice, and pro-active focus. Despite this variability, employees may experience a 
lack of consistency in practicing the organizational knowledge activities. The lack of 
consistency is grounded in a set of overall restricting mechanisms such as priority, 
competence, and variation.   1 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
High Reliability Organizations (HROs) are characterized by the overall demand for reliability 
to avoid serious operational failures. The consequences of such failures can often be 
disastrous. HROs operate tightly coupled, complex, and highly interdependent technologies 
(Perrow, 1986). In addition, these organizations often face dynamic physical, economic, and 
political environments. According to LaPorte & Consolini (1991), the operating challenges of 
HROs are twofold: (1) to manage complex, demanding technologies, making sure to avoid 
major failures, and (2) to maintain the capacity for meeting periods of very high peak demand, 
and production. Common examples of HROs are nuclear power plants, energy utility plants, 
transportation systems (aircrafts, space shuttles, shipping), chemical plants, and offshore 
petroleum installations. 
 
Due to the characteristics of HROs, learning and organizational knowledge in such 
organizations meet challenging conditions. Obviously, learning processes such as 
experimentation, trial-and-error, and learning from failures and mistakes in their original form 
are not preferred due to the potentially catastrophic outcomes. To some extent, HROs are 
unable to employ the common learning modes of exploitation and exploration (March, 1996). 
Exploitation involves the use and development of things already known; exploration involves 
the pursuit of new knowledge. Exploration can lead to trials escalating in unexpected ways, 
exploitation can also be difficult because systems are understood imperfectly and all possible 
failure modes have not yet occurred (Weick et al, 1999). In HROs, exploitation and 
exploration must then be built into the learning mechanisms in other ways, e.g. through 
training scenarios in controllable surroundings. 
 
To elaborate the learning conditions i n environments dependent on high reliability, a case 
study was conducted in a Norwegian petroleum production company. Recognizing that 
trustworthy learning mechanisms include overcoming troublesome barriers, the company 
itself initiated an organizational knowledge project within their emergency organization. The 
aim was to revitalize existing organizational knowledge mechanisms according to identified 
barriers, and to suggest and integrate additional elements of collective practice. The project 
consisted of two phases: (I) a contingency study including a mapping of organizational 
knowledge practice, barriers, and status, and suggestions for revitalized approaches or 
mechanisms; (II) testing, implementation, and evaluation of revitalized organizational 
knowledge mechanisms. This paper reports results from phase I of the project.   2 
2.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
The theoretical framework of the paper is grounded in theories of  high reliability 
organizations (Weick, 1987; LaPorte & Consolini, 1991; Schulman, 1993; Weick & Roberts, 
1993; Weick et al, 1999; Roberts & Bea, 2001; Rosness et al, 2000; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001), 
and theories of communities of practice (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Brown & Duguid, 1991; 
1998; 2001; Wenger, 1998; Cook & Brown, 1999; Gherardi & Nicolini, 2000).  
 
Theories of HROs draw attention to the importance of organizational redundancy, requisite 
variety, and information richness to achieve reliable performance. In this paper, the 
importance of the latter; information richness, will be discussed. Information richness is the 
ability of information or media to change human understanding within a time interval (Daft & 
Lengel, 1984). Usually, oral media are believed richer than written media, and synchronous 
media (immediate feedback) are believed richer than asynchronous media (delayed feedback). 
Too much information richness may introduce the inefficiencies of over-complication, and 
too little information richness may introduce the inaccuracy of over-simplification. HROs 
involve system complexity, and ri ch media provide multiple cues and quick feedback, which 
are essential for complex issues but less essential for routine issues (Weick, 1987). The work 
tasks in HROs are typically carried out by a large number of engineers. Organizations with 
engineers as the predominant employee category often reveal a tendency towards developing 
organizational knowledge mechanisms based on low media richness (Aase, 1997; Pedersen et 
al, 2003). If HROs need rich, dense talk to maintain complexity, it may be hard to generate 
that richness if face-to-face communication is devalued (Weick, 1987). 
 
Theories of communities of practice are occupied with the importance of a practice -based 
view on learning and knowledge (Brown & Duguid, 1991; Wenger, 1998). In this perspective, 
knowledge is not necessarily something the organization possesses, but is created through the 
action of individual, groups and communities in practice-based arenas (Cook & Brown, 
1999). This means that in different communities of the organization, aspects like dialogue, 
reflection, analysis, and socialization are important for the creation and circulation of 
organizational knowledge. Reliable, failure-free performance is then seen as a competence 
developed within organizational practices, emerging from a collective process involving 
people, technologies, and textual and symbolic forms (Gherardi & Nicolini, 2000). Within 
this perspective, HROs are dependent on face-to-face encounters, feedback arenas, and 
activities in a practice-based setting to build organizational knowledge. 
 
A community of practice that persists for a certain amount of time will eventually develop 
what scholars call reifications. Reification can be defined as “the process of giving form to 
our experience by producing objects that congeal this experience into thingness” (Wenger, 
1998: 58). Laws, procedures and tools are the product or “things” created by the process of 
giving form to a certain understanding. The reification process seems to be motivated by a 
need for stability and consensus. Through interactions and negotiations, the members of the 
community have reached a certain agreement as to how they perceive certain aspects of 
reality. In order to co-ordinate the actions of the members, this agreed understanding is 
codified as a truth or a rule that is relatively lasting.  
 
In HROs, reifications may lead to established paradigms within safety and emergency 
management. Weick (1987) claims that we have considered reliability in conventional ways   3 
using ideas of structure, training, and redundancy, and seem to be up against some limits in 
where those ideas can take us. His argument is that maintaining high reliability requires 
mindfulness with attention to hazards and weak signals, a broad action repertoire, and a 
willingness to consider alternatives (Weick et al., 1999). Consequently, safety and reliability 
should be regarded as dynamic nonevents. Reliability is not a “bankable” asset, meaning that 
you cannot “fix” a safety problem or store up safety, and then move on (Schulman, 1993). 
Treating safety and reliability as dynamic nonevents means to prepare the organization for the 
unexpected through interaction, attentiveness, communication, and competence (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2001). 
 
A broad action repertoire in maintaining safety and reliability should be reflected in the range 
of organizational knowledge mechanisms in an organization. An organization is faced with a 
multitude of means suitable for organizational knowledge. Hansen et. al. (1999) categorize 
different organizational knowledge means by using the dichotomy of people-to-document vs. 
people-to-people approaches. People-to-document approaches are characterized by the 
integration of organizational knowledge in written routines and documents such as databases, 
policies, procedures, responsibility matrixes and job descriptions. People-to-people 
approaches focus on the integration of organizational knowledge into working practice. 
Common examples are seminars, courses, training programs, mentoring, learning sessions, 
professional networks and s ocial events (Pedersen & Aase, 2000). People-to-document 
approaches are typically more structured and hence easier to control compared to people-to-
people approaches. The content can be described as one-way explicit information. People-to-
people approaches, although more unstructured and spontaneous, represents a richer source of 
information incorporating both tacit and explicit knowledge.  
 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
 
Based on the theoretical framework, following research assumptions have been developed:  
 
HROs need organizational knowledge mechanisms based on rich media to properly 
achieve failure-free performance, i.e. trial-without-error learning (A1).  
 
Organizational knowledge within HROs should be characterized by a broad action 
repertoire to redefine experimentation and trial-and-error learning, and a high degree 
of pro-active focus to prepare for unexpected events (A2). 
 
The research assumptions have been used as guiding questions in the research process rather 
than hypotheses to be verified or rejected. The open nature of the assumptions calls for 
qualitative research methods. An exploratory case study design was chosen to gain 
understanding of the organizational knowledge mechanisms within a typical HRO. The case 
company is a Norwegian oil and gas company operating in the North Sea. The focal area of 
the case study has been the company’s accident preparedness, with the objective of 
illustrating learning conditions in a high-risk setting. The company was chosen based on their 
own interest in mapping their existing organizational knowledge mechanisms, barriers, and 
areas of improvement within the emergency organization.  
   4 
Methods included 25 semi-structured interviews, 3 workshops, participant and non-participant 
observation, and document analysis. The data collection took place in a period of 10 months 
in 2002, and was limited to the tactical and strategic level of the emergency organization. 
Informants were key personnel within the emergency organization in all business areas, and 
key personnel within organizational knowledge. Table 1 shows the different data collection 
methods in the case study together with their main contents. 
 
 
Data collection method 
 
Contents 
Semi-structured interviews 
 
Organizational knowledge activities, mechanisms, barriers 
Non-participant observation 
 
Emergency drills 
Participant observation 
 
Emergency seminars, meetings, informal discussions 
Documents 
 
Emergency regulations, requirements, evaluation reports 
Workshops 
 
Analysis of interviews/ observations, presentation of results 
 
Table 1.  Data collection methods 
 
Semi-structured interviews were accomplished according to an interview guide covering 
different aspects of organizational knowledge (Pedersen et al, 2003). Interview summaries 
were written and structured according to broad organizational knowledge categories such as 
concept, means and activities, practices, examples, problems and barriers, future priorities, 
etc. Analysis of interview summaries and observations was carried out in two workshops 
gathering three company representatives, and two researchers. Results from phase I of the 
organizational knowledge project were presented in a workshop gathering representatives 
from all business areas in the case company. 
 
4.  CONTEXT: EMERGENCY IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY  
 
The oil and gas industry is characterized by an overall demand for high reliability. The basic 
assumption of modern safety philosophy within this industry is that accidents are preventable. 
Many companies and organizations work according to a so-called ‘zero philosophy’, with 
zero accidents and injuries as the overall objective. The oil and gas industry has been said to 
be in the forefront in the work of such safety philosophy. Today, this industry, together with 
many others, faces extensive challenges due to recent accidents with causes related to cost 
pressure, manning reductions, and scarce maintenance resources. 
 
4.1  Oil and gas industry in the North Sea 
The industrial setting of oil and gas companies operating in the North Sea is characterized by 
technologically demanding, high-risk operations. Oil and gas development projects offshore 
are large-scale, complex projects with many interfaces between different organizations and   5 
organizational units contributing to the project’s accomplishment. There is an extensive use of 
contractors and subcontractors, with major organizational interfaces between the operating oil 
company and project and design contractors. Production of oil and gas takes place in severe 
environments with large amounts of hydrocarbons under high pressure. Each oil and gas 
installation in the North Sea is a highly compressed work place for hundreds of people. The 
evacuation possibilities are limited, and the human, environmental, and financial 
consequences of an explosion are extensive. 
 
A traditional engineering perspective characterizes the oil and gas industry. A discipline-
based way of structuring work is characteristic, making the companies think in disciplines 
such as piping, process, structure, mechanical, electrical, etc. The engineering perspective is 
furthermore characterized by an extensive use of formalized routines and procedures. The use 
of documentation is seen as a vital element in development, design and operation, and as an 
important part of managing the business. At different organizational  levels, requirements and 
procedures are developed to guide and support the workers in operating specific equipment, 
or accomplishing different work tasks. The oil and gas companies are also subject to strict 
standardization and documentation demands from Norwegian authorities. As a consequence, 
almost every work task or operation offshore is covered by written procedures. 
 
4.2  Emergency organization 
In oil and gas companies, emergency planning and emergency organization are some of the 
most vital functions. Within the industry, emergency is commonly defined as follows: 
 
“… the totality of technical, operational, and organizational efforts preventing a hazard from 
developing into an accident, or reducing the damages from the accident…”  
 
In addition, many oil and gas companies stress the importance of a pro-active emergency 
management. By pro-active emergency management, the companies mean, “to identify 
challenges and be prepared for possibilities and threats through competence and 
comprehensive insight in activities and operations”. 
  
Emergency in the Norwegian oil and gas industry is well regulated by authorities and the 
industry itself. There are regulations, requirements, directives, and plans covering aspects 
such as plans for establishing and maintaining crisis management, risk and emergency 
analyses, alert notification, evacuation, rescue, damage reduction, personnel care, information 
services, training programs, exercises, etc. 
 
An emergency organization is built in the oil and gas companies where employees have their 
roles, responsibilities, and tasks clearly defined. The organization is often defined in first, 
second, and third order. First order meaning operational units, second order meaning tactical 
support functions in the business area, and third order meaning strategic management 
functions at the company level. 
 
4.3  Learning conditions within emergency 
Learning-wise, emergency includes elements of great importance for oil and gas companies. 
Activities are based on a high degree of pro-active focus, training, and improvisation. Below   6 
are the most important conditions for organizational knowledge within an emergency 
organization described: 
 
•  Trial-without-error 
Emergency activities are characterized by learning processes where trial -and-error and 
experimentation cannot be tolerated due to the potentially catastrophic consequences. 
Processes where trial-without-error is distinctive is therefore characteristic for learning 
and knowledge sharing. 
 
•  To expect the unexpected 
The main purpose of all safety and emergency work is to avoid accidents. This 
includes preventive and pro-active activities. Pro-active ability is the capacity or 
creativity to think in advance in order to transform trial -and-error learning to trial-
without-error learning. To prepare the organization for accidents with still unknown 
chains of incidents and causations requires learning processes focusing on 
improvisation, unpredictability, and simulation. 
 
•  Exercises and training 
The ability to pro-actively expect the unexpected is affected by the organization’s 
competence in imagination and improvisation. In this respect, emergency training 
scenarios of different kinds are commonly used. Learning arenas will then come in 
form of basic emergency training, emergency drills, tabletop exercises, and debriefs. 
 
•  Slack and heterogeneity 
To train the organization for handling unexpected incidents and complex relations, a 
certain degree of organizational slack is necessary. This includes room for knowledge 
creation, knowledge sharing, and reflection i n general. In addition, a sufficient 
divergence in employees’ background and analytical perspectives must exist. This 
heterogeneity will provide alternative theories, models, or causal assumptions to 
improve technology or production processes, and to avoid tunnel visions. 
 
•  ‘Shadow’ organization 
The emergency organization is built so that all employees have their defined roles, 
responsibilities, and tasks. This organization exists across, and in addition to, the 
formal organization. This requires well-prepared efforts and extra resources for 
knowledge sharing and learning of emergency behaviour within the shadow 
organization. 
 
•  Building emergency competence 
Emergency competence must be built at the same level as other forms of competence 
in an organization. Safety and emergency cannot solely be built into technology and 
production. Reliable and failure-free behaviour is a collective competence to be 
developed through face-to-face encounters and arenas for dialogue and feedback.   
 
To what degree different companies in the oil and gas industry meet these learning conditions 
within emergency is a question for discussion. Below, the organizational knowledge practice 
within one specific oil and gas company is described in more detail. 
   7 
5.  ORGANIZATIONAL KNOWLEDGE PRACTICE WITHIN EMERGENCY 
 
Results from project phase I in the case company indicate a variety of different organizational 
knowledge efforts and processes, based on different levels of information richness and 
collective practice.  
 
5.1  Organizational knowledge activities 
Respondents refer to different ‘methods’ for organizational knowledge within emergency: 
traditional emergency response training and drills, table top exercises, debrief, evaluation 
reports, shift overlaps, different network initiatives, informal contacts, and computer 
databases. Table 2 shows some of the most important organizational knowledge activities 
within emergency, indicating their level of information richness, collective and practice -based 
elements, and pro-active focus. Information richness means the ability of information or 
media to change human understanding. Collective practice means the ability of active 
participation in arenas of practices. Pro-active focus means the ability to think in advance, 
using imaginative skills. The categorization is based mainly on the informants’ statements and 
opinions of the different emergency activities. 
   
 
 
OK activity 
 
 
Information richness 
 
Collective practice 
 
Pro-active focus 
 
Emergency drills  High  High  Medium 
 
Table top exercises  High  Medium  High 
 
Informal discussions  High  Medium  Low/medium/high 
 
Debriefs  High  Medium  Low 
 
Knowledge networks   Medium  Medium  Medium 
 
Basic emergency training  Medium  Medium  Medium 
 
Emergency shift overlaps  Medium  Medium  Low 
 
Evaluation reports  Low  Low  Medium 
 
Emergency knowledge databases  Low  Low  Low 
 
 
Table 2.  Organizational knowledge practices within emergency 
 
Below, the different organizational knowledge activities are described in more detail. 
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•  Emergency drills 
Emergency drills are rigorous and realistic simulations of accidents carried out in practice 
at different levels of the organization, and in different areas of the business. Some 
emergency drills involve the entire emergency organization at operational, tactical, and 
strategic level. The emergency drills have a high degree of information richness and 
collective practice due to extensive face-to-face communication, dialogue, meetings, and 
emergency activities carried in the participants’ own work setting. Emergency drills in 
offshore oil companies are regulated by pre-defined hazards and accident situations 
instructed by authorities and industrial associations. In the case company there are 17 pre -
defined hazards and accident scenarios to be covered by emergency drills of different 
kinds. The emergency drills are carefully planned and managed by a ‘players staff’ 
according to detailed scenario-descriptions (shooting scripts) for each of the 17 current 
accident situations. Since emergency drills most often have pre-defined contents, the pro-
active focus is categorized as medium. In planning an emergency drill, one or several 
observers are appointed to follow the drill closely, and to summarize the accomplishment 
of the drill in an evaluation report. According to informants in the case company, the 
degree of useful knowledge sharing in the emergency drills is dependent on several 
aspects. For instance the ability participants have to share experiences, the quality of the 
current scenario to trigger participants’ personal involvement, and the role of the observer. 
 
•  Tabletop exercises 
Tabletop exercises are scenario-based training situations carried out without considering 
physical, practical, and time-related aspects of the current accident scenario. The elements 
of stress in realistic emergency drills are put aside. In the tabletop exercise, participants 
are gathered around a table, assessing and reflecting on different features of a scenario put 
forward by a “players staff” or a facilitator. Participants have to describe their reactions 
and solutions to different situations, and there is a more thorough discussion on each 
feature of the scenario than in an emergency drill. A tabletop exercise can be arranged at 
different levels and with different extent, concerning all aspects within the emergency 
area. The tabletop exercises have a high degree of information richness and pro-active 
focus, and a medium level of collective practice since the exercises take place around the 
table and not in the practical or operational work setting. Informants are predomi nantly 
positive to the tabletop exercises, asking for a more frequent use of them. The exercises 
are valued as the best arena for learning and knowledge sharing at a pro-active and 
strategic level. Reasons are explained to be the informal discussions and p roblem-driven 
reflections on expected and unexpected situations and challenges. At the time being, there 
is a variable frequency of tabletop exercises in the case company. 
 
•  Informal discussions 
Informants in the case company see informal discussions as one of the most positive 
forms for knowledge sharing within the emergency organization. Informal discussions are 
often problem-driven, including face-to-face encounters in a daily work setting. This 
implies high levels of information richness and collective practice. The level of pro-active 
focus will vary within different situations and discussions. Restricting barriers for 
informal discussions within emergency in the case company are busy workdays, and 
geographical/ physical division among members of the emergency organization. 
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•  Debriefs 
Debriefs are meetings held subsequent to the emergency drills to summarize and learn 
from practicing the activities included in the current accident scenario. Debriefing 
meetings can be arranged at different levels and in di fferent parts of the emergency 
organization. Usually, the observer(s) of the emergency drill organizes and facilitates the 
debrief. In some of the large-scale emergency drills, debriefs have been arranged 
gathering all participants from the different level s (operational, tactical, strategic) to an 
experience seminar. These seminars are valued positively by the participants, increasing 
the possibility for immediate feedback and better understanding of other aspects and 
perspectives of the emergency drills. C ollective discussions and reflections are important 
parts of debriefs, therefore implying a high degree of information richness and collective 
practice. The pro-active focus of debriefs is low due to the retrospective nature of 
debriefs. 
 
•  Knowledge networks 
There are several knowledge network initiatives in the case company within safety in 
general, and within emergency in specific. The emergency knowledge network gathers 
key personnel from different business areas in regular formal meetings for discussion of 
emergency related matters. Some business areas organize yearly emergency seminars for 
all participants at the tactical level of the emergency organization. These seminars consist 
of lectures, group work and re-training for the participants. Common for most of the 
knowledge network initiatives within emergency in the case company is a lack of 
participation and enthusiasm. Most informants call for a revitalization of the 
responsibility, contents, and structure of the knowledge networks within emergency. 
Level of information richness, collective practice, and pro-active focus for the current 
network initiatives are characterized as medium. 
 
•  Basic emergency training 
There are different courses for basic emergency training in the case company, mainly 
designed for the operational and tactical level of the emergency organization. The courses 
include different levels of interactive and practical elements. Most informants do not value 
basic emergency courses as essential for knowledge sharing within the emergency a rea. 
Level of information richness, collective practice, and pro-active focus for emergency 
courses are characterized as medium. 
 
•  Emergency shift overlaps 
Emergency shift overlaps are regular meetings between employees going off emergency 
duty and employees going on emergency duty. Recent incidents and   situations are 
discussed, and employees going on duty are updated on what has happened, and important 
issues to know for the upcoming emergency shift. The shift overlaps are considered as an 
arena for knowledge sharing by the participants. The focus of the meeting is retrospective, 
leading to a low degree of pro-active focus. Level of information richness and collective 
practice is considered as medium. 
 
•  Evaluation reports 
Emergency drills are summarized in written evaluation reports, usually carried out by the 
appointed observer(s) of the drill. The evaluation reports are written according to a fixed 
outline with a standardized reporting form, and different participants contribute with input   10 
to the reports.  Written reports are categorized as low on information richness, and 
collective practice. The main focus of the evaluation reports is future improvement 
actions, implying a medium level of pro-active focus. Informants differ in their opinions 
on the knowledge sharing potential of evaluation reports. Some feel that the reports 
picture essential aspects of the emergency drills, while others refer to the reports as too 
comprehensive, and question the standardized format of the reports. 
 
•  Emergency knowledge databases 
There are several databases and intranet network portals relevant for safety and 
emergency in the case company, but none of them are specifically designed for the 
emergency area. The most common database within safety is an accident/ incident 
database for reporting and experience transfer, based on retrospective data. Most 
informants did not value the existing databases as important tools for knowledge sharing 
within emergency. Without building supplementary knowledge sharing activities related 
to the knowledge databases, the level of information richness, collective practice, and pro-
active focus is characterized as low. 
 
5.2  Organizational knowledge barriers 
Despite a wide range of ‘methods’ or approaches, informants in the case company to a certain 
degree experience a lack of consistency and resources for organizational knowledge within 
the emergency organization. Below are some of the most distinctive barriers described, using 
the informants’ own descriptions: 
 
•  Lack of emergency priority 
As pointed out earlier, the emergency organization is built across the formal organization, 
with a minimum of full-time key positions. Emergency is seen as an area that should be 
fully integrated in day-to-day operations. Emergency tasks are thus often defined as 
supplementary to employees’ ordinary work tasks, resulting in a priority problem. This 
priority problem often seems to be more distinctive among blunt-end managers/designers 
than with sharp-end operators
1 closer to the possible accident scenarios. In the blunt-end 
of current hazards, possible consequences are less explicit.  
 
“…In periods when you are not part of the emergency duty, you down-prioritise it compared 
to your daily duties. The structure and organization of the emergency duty diminish the 
responsibility. If this was part of my regular job, I would have put more effort into it”.    
 
In addition, increased focus on efficiency and economy can have negative effects on the 
emergency commitment. 
 
•  Lack of emergency competence 
One of the most important features within emergency learning and knowledge sharing is 
that emergency should be seen as a collective competence developed in communities of 
practice. Within an emergency organization, one of the main problems is that key 
personnel at different levels and in different business areas meet occasionally. 
 
                                            
1 Reason (1997) uses the dimension sharp-end operators versus blunt-end managers/ designers to categorize 
proximity to hazard.   11 
”At times when I enter the emergency room, I see only unfamiliar faces. One of the criteria to 
succeed as a team is to know the strengths and weaknesses of the people you work with. In 
addition, people change emergency duty quite often, resulting in a lack of continuity in the 
teams”. 
 
To build a collective emergency competence requires time and resources for cross-
disciplinary knowledge sharing. In addition, a basic competence level should be achieved 
through emergency training and courses. There is a tendency in the case company towards 
blunt-end emergency managers not assessing emergency training as valuable for 
themselves. This may result in a lack of focus, and subsequently not enough resources set 
aside f or emergency training and activities. Competence requirements should thus be 
relevant at all levels of the emergency organization. 
 
•  Lack of variation 
Informants experience a lack of variation in the different training, exercises, and 
emergency drill activities in the case company. Emergency drills are for instance planned 
and accomplished according to the authority-regulated set of pre-defined hazards and 
accident scenarios for offshore petroleum production. 
 
“We could be practicing ourselves into a trap. W e use the same hat in every emergency drill. 
We are not very inventive – we should have had more width and variation in the drills. We 
practice according to a fixed directive, using the same verification items over and over again. 
The strategic items are left out and we are being static. Somebody ought to think this over!” 
 
Some informants claim that the emergency exercises and drills are satisfactorily at the 
operational and tactical level of alert notification, coordination, and communication, but 
less capable of including elements of pro-active and strategic emergency management. 
 
Even if the number of organizational knowledge activities seems sufficient, including enough 
variation with regards to information richness, collective practice, and pro-active focus, there 
seems to be a set of overall restricting mechanisms for emergency learning in the case 
company organization. These mechanisms are all grounded in matters of priority, resources, 
and competence level. 
 
6.  IMPROVING THE CURRENT EMERGENCY PRACTICE 
 
Results from the case study have shown a variety of organizational knowledge activities 
implying a broad action repertoire within emergency. The degree of information richness, 
collective practice, and pro-active focus could thus be valued as sufficient. Nevertheless, 
employees experience a lack of consistency in practicing the organizational knowledge 
activities grounded in restricting mechanisms such as priority, competence, and variation. 
 
According to the research assumptions reported earlier in the paper, organizational knowledge 
mechanisms based on rich media is indeed present in the case company (research assumption 
A1). The organizational knowledge action repertoire within emergency can be characterized 
as being broad, including both people-to-people approaches and people-to-document 
approaches (research assumption A2, first part). The pro-active focus of the knowledge   12 
sharing activities should be an area for further refinement and priority (research assumption 
A2, second part). 
 
In HRO literature, emergency can be defined as training, preparation, and management of 
something unexpected, surprising, and complex (e.g. Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). In many of 
the oil and gas companies operating in the North Sea, emergency is defined more narrowly as 
the t otality of technical, operational, and organizational efforts preventing a hazard from 
developing into an accident, or reducing the damages from the accident. Together with the 
tendency towards pre-defining relevant accident scenarios, and the perceived lack of variation 
in the different emergency activities, this may lead to a preoccupation with planning and 
confirmation related to current scenarios. A pro-active focus incorporating imaginative skills 
challenges narrow searches for confirmation or tunnel v isions by fertilizing variation and 
heterogeneity.     
 
Based on input from phase I of the case study project, a revitalization process with the aim of 
improving organizational knowledge should acknowledge existing approaches, but emphasize 
stronger elements of collective practice and pro-active focus. This led to the following 
suggestions for improved organizational knowledge mechanisms, combining rich media with 
collective and practice-based elements in a pro-active focus: 
 
(a) To increase the extension and variation in tabletop exercises including storytelling and 
individual reflection tasks.  
(b) Dialogue-based learning sessions related to emergency evaluation reports.  
(c)  Contingency decision simulator for interactive training within the emergency 
organization.  
 
In addition, the resource pull between ordinary work tasks and emergency tasks should be 
clarified. The three improved organizational knowledge mechanisms will be subject for 
testing and evaluation in phase II of the case study project. 
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